A 1997/98 risk management study in flood-prone areas of central western Queensland was the first practical application of national emergency risk management guidelines based on the Australian/New Zealand risk management standard [1] . The paper reports on the study, its outcomes and its implications for future comprehensive and integrated emergency risk management programs.
Introduction
Two towns, Charleville and Augathella, in a flood-prone area of central western Queensland, have a long history of costly and disruptive flooding. A number of studies had been undertaken following a major flood affecting both towns in 1990, but there had been no community consensus on the structural and non-structural solutions offered. A further major flood in 1997 provided an opportunity for a new flood risk management study, based on the recently approved Australian/New Zealand risk management standard [1] and new national guidelines for the application of that standard in emergency management which were then in course of preparation. In undertaking the study, the authors had first to deal with the definition of risk in the community safety context, and then to develop a local disaster planning methodology to address that risk.
This report describes the study and its outcomes, which are seen as having implications for future comprehensive and integrated emergency risk management programs. But first we need to address this question of 'risk'.
Defining risk -a general problem
Most dictionaries define risk in terms such as 'hazard, danger; exposure to mischance or peril', from the Italian root rischiare, to run into danger. In common usage the terms 'hazard' and 'danger' are often used interchangeably with risk, which leads to some confusion when that term is used technically, as it is widely in fields such as engineering, insurance and financial management, and business continuity planning. Of particular relevance to the field of emergency management is the confusion which can arise over the terms hazard and risk for, as noted by Short and Clarke [2] :
"Conceptual problems plague the study of risk. Commonly used terms acquire technical meanings and technical terms are used far beyond their generating domains, both problems conducive to misunderstanding. In common parlance, risk and hazard are sometimes equated ... (but) technical definitions view these terms as related, but distinct." [p.5]
Risk in the emergency management context
This confusion has often been demonstrated in the field of emergency management, and various attempts have been made to differentiate between the terms 'hazard' and 'risk' [3] [4] [5] . These attempts tend to reflect the particular techno-scientific or psycho-social standpoints of the authors concerned. The current UN glossary of basic terms related to disaster management [6] leans towards the techno-scientific stance in defining both terms, with risk being defined as:
"Expected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged and economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period. Based on mathematical calculations, risk is a product of hazard and vulnerability." (emphasis added) while a hazard is defined as: "A threatening event, or the probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within a given time period and area."
The proposition that risk can be determined mathematically is clearly drawn from the common engineering view that risk is a product of the likelihood (probability) of hazard impact and its potential consequences, where both can be determined quantitatively or semi-quantitatively (a product arrived at through the use of some probability/consequence matrix). However, the UN definition suggests a similar mathematical relationship between hazard and a new term, vulnerability, defining the latter as: "Degree of loss (from 0% to 100%) resulting from a potentially damaging phenomenon."
These internationally-agreed definitions have been given widespread acceptance (e.g. [7] ). However, if there are recognized problems in the engineering approach to quantifying consequences [8, 9] , the problems are more severe (at least for an attempted mathematical approach) when it comes to considering vulnerability in the emergency management context.
There are various definitions, in the emergency management context, of 'disaster'
("a serious disruption of the functioning of a society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources." [6]) and 'emergency' (current Australian usage defines this as "an event, actual or imminent, which endangers or threatens to endanger life, property or the environment, and which requires a significant and coordinated response" [10] ). Whichever you use, it is evident that defining vulnerability in the emergency management context in terms of a 'degree of loss' may be necessary but is certainly not sufficient without some specification of what may be lost and the significance (in emergency management terms) of a particular degree of loss. What, for example, does a '0% loss' or a '100% loss' of a particular facility, or any particular figure in between, actually mean in terms of its community impact? A definition of vulnerability more suited to the needs of emergency management, in that it sets the term in a social context, is "the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard" [11] . A more extensive but similar definition is:
"Vulnerability is a characteristic of individuals and groups of people who inhabit a given natural, social and economic space, within which they are differentiated according to their varying position in society into more or less vulnerable individuals and groups. It is a complex characteristic produced by a combination of factors derived especially (but not entirely) from class, gender or ethnicity." [12] Indeed, it is the very complexity of this 'characteristic' in the UNDHA definition of risk as a product of hazard and vulnerability that renders the formulation somewhat less than useful. We need to ask whether there might be a very different approach to the subject of risk in the emergency management context.
The Australian standard and guidelines

The Australian risk management standard
The Australian/New Zealand Standard -Risk Management [1] was first published in November 1995, as a joint product of the two national standard authorities. The key characteristics of the standard are stated succinctly in the Preface:
"It is generic and independent of any specific industry or economic sector. The design and implementation of the risk management system will be influenced by the varying needs of an organization, its particular objectives, its products and services, and the processes and specific practices employed. ...The risk management process can be applied in any situation where an undesired or unexpected outcome could be significant or where opportunities are identified" [p.2].
The risk management process diagram set out in the standard (see Figure 1 ) would be very familiar to those with some claim to professional standing as 'risk managers' -the body of the process deals with the identification, analysis and evaluation of risk, and concludes with the consideration of appropriate treatments of those risks. Two features of the process may be unfamiliar, however -the proposal that the whole process should start with a detailed examination of the strategic, organizational and risk management context within which the process is to be applied, and the requirement that the whole process should be conducted in an environment of constant monitoring and review involving the stakeholders in the process.
These features are central to the whole approach taken in the development of the standard, which is that risk management in any organization is not simply the preserve of those who hold the title of 'risk managers' but is indeed the responsibility of the managers of the whole organization. As the standard itself emphasizes, risk management must take place "in the context of the wider goals, objectives and strategies of the organization" and to parallel the well-known phrase that 'war is too important to be left to the generals', risk management in any organization is seen as too important to be left to the risk managers. It is more properly the concern of management itself.
In the Australian setting, of course, as in most others, such agreed standards do not have the force of law, but over time they tend to become the 'benchmarks' by which organizational behaviour is judged in courts of law, whether in the cases of claims of negligence or in the more serious cases where responsibility for loss of life or serious injury is being assessed. In these latter cases, the Australian coronial system is generally based on the UK model, but most parts of Australia now require the coroner to rule on actions necessary to prevent a repeat of the event instead of simply requiring a determination of responsibility for the event itself. Not surprisingly, the implications of the Australian risk management standard are still being assessed in various quarters and, as you would perhaps expect, is meeting with some resistance from risk managers who feel either that their domain is being usurped by management or that 'nothing has really changed'. (This latter reaction is one of the problems associated with any fundamental redefinition of a function, such as risk management, while still retaining the title within which many practitioners are quite content to pursue their established practices.)
One significant feature in the introduction of the standard, however, is that in recognition of the avowedly generic nature of the standard itself, the various industries and economic sectors to which it is addressed have been invited to develop guidelines for the application of the standard in their particular environments and to have these guidelines registered with the standards authority as adhering to the principles and process prescribed in the standard itself.
An early responder to this invitation was the Australian federal National Emergency Management Committee (NEMC), [13] the 'peak consultative body' in Australia dealing with policy matters and coordination on behalf of Commonwealth, State and Territory emergency management authorities.
The Australian emergency risk management guidelines
In 1996, the NEMC endorsed the principles and general process of the risk management standard for incorporation into revised National Emergency Management Competency Standards and directed that work should commence on the production of 'industry specific guidelines' based on the standard. A number of guideline drafts were subsequently prepared by groups representative of Commonwealth and State/Territory emergency management organizations, and subsequently submitted to Standards Australia for endorsement.
(Both the risk management standard and the emergency risk management guidelines underwent major revision in mid-1999. For the 1997/98 study reported on in this paper, however, the terms of reference for the study had specified that the 1995 edition of the standard and the latest available draft of the guidelines would guide the study's process and outcomes.)
The risk management process prescribed in the 1995 edition of the Australian/New Zealand risk management standard is shown at Figure 1 . The process prescribed in the November 1997 draft of the national 'Guidelines on Emergency Risk Management' prepared for NEMC consideration is shown at Figure 2 . There are, as would be expected, close parallels between the two, and indeed they both have much in common, in structure and terminology, with what would broadly be recognized as the elements of the generic management process described in many management models and terminologies. However, the transition between the generic risk management process described in the standard and that depicted in the 'industry-specific' guidelines has clearly not been altogether without its problems, for example:
• While supposedly generic, the standard's process is clearly directed towards the risk management requirements of a single organization, working within an environment where risks are often industry-and even location-specific; such risks are essentially institutional. The guidelines recognize the multi-organizational nature of emergency management and the diverse and external-to-the-organization nature of the risks which must be addressed. Thus organizations involved in emergency management necessarily must manage their own institutional risks as well as participating in a multi-organizational process in the management of those external, community risks in which they have a role or responsibility.
•
In its 'Analyse Risks' step, the standard employs the traditional 'risk = probability x consequence' formulation and methodologies. Having chosen to redefine risk as "the likelihood of harmful consequences arising from the interaction of hazards, communities and the environment" and vulnerability as "the susceptibility and resilience of the community and environment to hazards" -formulations clearly owing much to the work of researchers such as Blaikie and Cannon, mentioned earlier -the guidelines are relatively silent on the methodologies appropriate to its 'Analyse Risks and Determine Vulnerability' element.
As the guidelines stand, the options for 'treatment' of risk proposed are confined to the strategies of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR) which are defined in the 'comprehensive and integrated emergency management' concepts adopted in Australia in the 1980s. There are other possible options for 'treatment', referred to in the standard, which certainly warrant consideration in emergency management (e.g. risk avoidance and risk transfer).
As indicated earlier, both the standard and the guidelines have undergone further revision, and in the case of the guidelines these have gone some way towards dealing with the second and third of the three issues referred to. However, as will be seen, all three were to have some impact on the process and outcomes of the flood risk management study undertaken in 1997/98 in flood-prone areas of central western Queensland, which are described below.
The Queensland flood risk management study
Background to the study
Charleville (population approximately 3,500) and its smaller sister Augathella (population about 350) are typical country towns on the banks of the Warrego River in Murweh Shire in central western Queensland, some 700km by air from the State capital, Brisbane. Like many small towns in inland Australia, they grew up in the middle of the 19th century where transport and stock routes crossed meandering river systems and consequently have a history of flooding. In April 1990 a major flood of 8.54m at Charleville resulted in major evacuations in both towns, disruptions to essential services (including telecommunications) and significant economic and social consequences in both towns. Recovery bills totalled in excess of $71.6M. Flood studies undertaken in 1991 and 1993 following the event recommended a suite of structural and non-structural solutions to the problem. One of the solutions offered involved the building of an extensive levée at Charleville, a proposal which was seen by many residents as both physically and socially divisive. Largely due to the resultant community ferment, the recommendations had not been acted upon before another major flood, reaching a height of 7.39m at Charleville and again with serious consequences, occurred in 1997.
Against this background, in mid-1997 the, Queensland Department of Emergency Services commissioned a Flood Risk Study for both towns; two main deliverables were sought:
• A list of intervention strategies to address community vulnerabilities to flooding.
• A methodology for local disaster management planning based on the Australian risk management standard.
The study was undertaken by the two authors first named.
The study framework
As described in the previous Section, the process model described in a November 1997 draft of the national emergency risk management guidelines was a 'given' in the terms of reference for the study. The process model described in that draft and as shown in Figure  2 was itself drawn down from the standard and formed the basis of the framework for the study. However, as preliminary work on the study progressed, the issues arising from considerations of risk in the community context discussed in the first Section of this paper, and in particular the issue of vulnerability, needed to be addressed. In consequence, it was agreed with the Project Management Board that the study process would be modified by the inclusion of a requirement to develop a community vulnerability profile as an output from the 'Characterize Hazards, Community and Environment' stage. This profile was seen as providing an essential tool for evaluating possible interventions considered in the 'Identify, Evaluate and Implement Interventions' step and for testing individual interventions for their potential to reduce community vulnerability. This resulted in the modified process diagram shown in Figure 3 and so the study proceeded through the following steps:
• In establishing the emergency risk management context, a number of meetings were held with State-based agencies and with the community itself, supplemented by the study of background material, reports and policy documents.
• Risk evaluation criteria were developed in close consultation with local authorities and in both formal and informal meetings with the community. A key criterion rapidly emerged -the community itself indicated a general acceptance of the elements of risk associated with flood events up to the 1997 level, but very low acceptance of floods above that level (e.g. floods at the 1990 level). Naturally, the degree of risk considered 'acceptable' by individuals and community sectors (particularly in the business sector) varied considerably, but extensive discussions with the community identified some important general agreements, viz: Figure 3 Main elements of the emergency risk management process (as modified during study)
• that flooding would continue to occur and cannot actually be stopped;
• that there is no one solution to the flooding problem;
• that any interventions need to be practicable and affordable, taking into consideration issues of efficacy, benefit and cost, and • that no one should be worse off as a result of interventions (the equity issue).
• Characterizing the flood hazard, the community and the environment was materially assisted by local council, reference groups, community and agency discussions during a number of visits to Charleville and Augathella, supplemented by research and data available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
• A process of recording and profiling community vulnerability to the flood hazard was developed and instituted -this issue will be dealt with in more detail later.
•
The analysis and evaluation of risks was undertaken progressively throughout the study, and the ranking of risks, in the context of the evaluation criteria developed earlier, was subject to much discussion with the local council and the community.
The final stages of the project involved the identification of potential intervention strategies and the evaluation of those strategies against the community vulnerability profiles developed earlier. The strategies and the evaluation were tested with State authorities, and again with the local council, reference groups and the community.
Study outcomes in outline
The study report has not yet been published by the Queensland State Government, on whose behalf it was commissioned by the Department of Emergency Services. However, some direct outcomes are readily discernible in regard to the study's two deliverables. The recommended flood intervention strategies embraced a broad mix of both structural and non-structural solutions, as indeed did the 1991 and 1993 studies. However, the difference in this case has been that the community itself has recognized (as a direct outcome of the extensive consultation process used in the study) that there is a range of possible 'solutions', and that a mix of such 'solutions' is necessary -no one measure is able to deal satisfactorily with the flood problem and be acceptable to all interest groups. None of the measures put forward is sufficient in itself; there are significant interdependencies between structural and non-structural measures, and additional interventions worthy of consideration are likely to be identified by the community over coming years.
The recommended measures were grouped into Must Do, Should Do and Could Do categories to indicate the broad priority attached to each group in terms of the immediacy and urgency of action. Measures were not prioritized within each group, this being seen as a joint responsibility of the local council and the community.
The study recommendations have been presented to the community by the Murweh Shire Council. Following further consultation, all non-structural recommendations have been implemented, and of the suggested structural measures, local government is currently proposing that priority be given to building levées at both towns, subject to feasibility in terms of political and funding opportunities. This proposal is still under debate within the community.
A local disaster planning methodology, developed and refined in the study, has been based on the risk management standard and the guidelines and has been delivered in template form.
Studies were conducted in Queensland in 1999 by the Department of Emergency Services to develop and further refine this methodology. These studies addressed multiple hazards in large urban environments -the Murweh Shire study was limited to a single risk, that of flooding, in a primarily rural environment. Once refined, the product will be suited to and made widely available for emergency risk management planning application at municipal level.
It needs to be noted in this connection that the Australian risk management standard and the emergency risk management guidelines are still themselves undergoing development, and in consequence the local planning methodology may need further refinement. It is also important to note that under Queensland arrangements there are three 'key players' involved in the processes of planning for and implementing effective emergency risk management:
• the State government, which must provide planning formats and guidelines, liaison, advice, effective facilitation when needed and general oversight of the planning process; • local governments which must manage the process at local level and oversee the implementation of outcomes of the process, and • the community itself, which must be given the opportunity to make effective input to the process through a planned and interactive consultation program.
In Queensland the structuring of this involvement has been facilitated by State initiatives including a policy shift at State level to a comprehensive, all hazards, 'whole of government' and integrated 'public safety' approach to community risk management in the disaster context, and by legislative and regulatory provisions which impose obligations and responsibilities on local governments in relation to public safety. The general policy and process models, which have resulted, could warrant consideration by other governments.
Issues raised by the study
In relation to the relevance of the Australian risk management standard to emergency risk management, it has already been noted that the generic risk management process described in the standard, based on the needs of single organizations dealing with institutional risks, requires modification to be applicable in the multi-organizational context of community risk management. Indeed, it may well be that the standard's process requires some modification even in the case of single organizations where their operations impose some form of potential risk to the community. In an environment of increasing privatization of essential services such as energy, water, transport and communications (the typical 'lifeline' services), the methodologies adequate for dealing with corporate and technical components of institutional risk may not prove adequate in dealing with the public risk which might be occasioned by a serious disruption or failure in such services.
Central to this issue is the question of vulnerability. If risk in the public safety context is seen, as the Australian emergency risk management guidelines propose, as "the likelihood of harmful consequences arising from the interaction of hazards, communities and the environment", a suitable measure of the "susceptibility and resilience of the community and environment to hazards" -which the guidelines use as the definition of vulnerability -is critical to the emergency risk management process. While a large number of potential factors bearing on community and individual resilience can be located in the literature, no instrument immediately suitable for direct identification, assessment and evaluation of community vulnerability and applicable to the purposes of this study could be located.
Accordingly, an instrument for recording and profiling community vulnerability was developed during the course of the study, with consideration of the factors offered being limited to those which were both necessary and sufficient to be seen to bear on vulnerability and which offered some opportunity for measurement. At community level the instrument attempted to identify and assess the susceptibilities and resiliences in public safety provisions (community planning processes, mitigation measures and response/recovery capability) and in social infrastructure ('lifeline' components such as utilities and key structures/facilities, items of economic and environmental or cultural significance).
It was undoubtedly a somewhat crude instrument, and clearly more work needs to be done to refine and validate it, particularly in:
• identifying and selecting vulnerability indicators which are necessary, sufficient, measurable and applicable in 'all-risks' emergency risk management processes, and • developing a vulnerability profiling methodology including information sourcing and the design and application of appropriate models.
As regards the application of the process itself, there can be little doubt that a coherent methodology for the management of emergency risk at community level is an urgent need. The Flood Risk Management study was conducted against a background of considerable community ferment and some government inaction over possible solutions to the community's flood risk. It will be appreciated that this, coupled with earlier poorly conceived consultation processes, which had tended to polarize community views on the practicability and efficacy of recommended structural mitigation works, made for some difficulties. On more than one occasion, we were told that the community was 'meetinged-out' and 'thoroughly fed up'. Hopefully, the process template, when further refined, will have application both before and after the onset of events such as the 'Charleville floods of 1990/97'.
Conclusion
The 1997/98 risk management study in a flood-prone area of central western Queensland provided the first real opportunity to apply national emergency risk management guidelines based on the Australian/New Zealand risk management standard [1] . The study highlighted the importance, in the emergency risk management and community safety context, of treating risk as a complex interaction of hazard, community and environment, rather than as a simple product of hazard impact likelihood and consequence. A measure of community vulnerability is essential in emergency risk management studies. In developing an instrument for profiling and recording community vulnerability and a methodology for applying an emergency risk management process, the study is regarded as a significant innovation in emergency risk management.
The national emergency risk management guidelines and the standards on which they are based are being further developed. They too can be seen as representing a major innovation in the management of community risk and have significant implications for future comprehensive and integrated emergency risk management programs.
